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Ontological Completion in the Adult-Infant System 
 
Abstract 
In this paper I explore the ontology of the mother-infant system to define moments of 
physiological and psychological co-operation that form one entity for the completion of 
‘units of process’.  These moments of coupling between mother and infant form ontological 
wholes with shared consciousness.  For example, in the case of extreme, acute neonatal 
anxiety a process is initiated by the infant requiring co-regulation with an adult other.  The 
adult other provides closure to the process of anxiety, giving ontological completeness to the 
process.  This process of initiation, build, climax, and closure is illustrated by the infant’s 
vocal cry, which parallels the regulatory process.  The need for another in this particular 
processual unit demonstrates the infant in this event is not a distinct entity, but is embedded 
in a parent-infant system that together forms one unified whole. 
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Independence, Interdependence, and Infant Ontology 
The ontological status of a newborn infant is always in flux, it is dynamic.  The newborn 
infant is both an independent entity and an entity dependent on the psychological and 
physiological properties of a mother (for brevity I refer to all adult care-givers as ‘mother’).  
A newborn infant exists at different times either side of the boundary between independence 
and dependence on others.  The purpose of this paper is to help shed light on the 
psychological as well as physiological nature of the dynamic coupling and decoupling 
between infant and mother, and to potentially point to where coupling and de-coupling may 
go wrong and lead to pathology.  To do this, I will describe a process ontology of what it is 
‘to be’, ie. to have a mind, a will, and an existence (Delafield-Butt, 2008; 2009; 2014; 
Whitehead 1929), and apply this to a very particular category of infant cry, the cry of 
absolute crisis that occurs commonly in the first three months of life.  Both of these topics, 
the process metaphysic and the existential nature of a newborn crisis, are not well treated in 
the literature.  It is my hope that this novel approach is illuminating both for the philosophy 
of consciousness as well as for infant psychology, and that there may be some bearing on our 
understanding of the  psychopathological phenomenon of what can be referred to as 
‘ontological incompleteness’ (Stranghellini and Ballerini, 2004), or a rupture in the feeling of 
wholeness that is derived from completeness.  We find this expression in some cases of 
autism and schizophrenia, in post-natal maternal depression, and sometimes in the experience 
of the loss of an infant by a parent.  This paper speaks more widely to what constitutes an 
integrated whole subject as it proceeds through time.   
 
It used to be taken for granted that the infant was a distinct and separate entity with her own 
domain of autonomy quite distinct from that of other, adult minds.  However, Sptiz (1945) 
and Bowlby (1951) showed that psychological intimacy was as vital to the health of infants 
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as the primary physical needs of food and shelter.  They found that infants who did not have 
access to normal intimacy failed to thrive and often died.  It was not merely the material 
support of food, warmth, and hygiene that was necessary for the life of a human infant, the 
full embodiment of human psychological, emotional, and physical ‘contact’ was apparently 
also essential.  The nature of that contact, between an infant and her mother, has been a focus 
of study ever since.   
 
From birth, infants demonstrate an agency of basic intentions with depth of feeling expressed 
through movements of the face, hands, and voice to touch others (Delafield-Butt and 
Gangopadhyay, 2013; Delafield-Butt et al., 2018; Negayama et al., 2014; Trevarthen et al., 
2015; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2015).  They are active, engaging agents with a vital 
socio-emotional dimension that affects their physiological integrity (Brazelton, 1974; Stern, 
1985; Stern, 1971; Trevarthen, 1977; Trevarthen, 1998; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2013; 
Delafield-Butt and Trevarthen, 2013).  They are responsive to and can discriminate the sound 
of their mothers’ voice (van der Meer and van der Weel, 2011; Decasper and Fifer, 1980) and 
her odor and from others (Cernoch and Porter, 1985).  They engage with others with direct 
eye contact, facial expressions, and limb and hand movements commensurate with their 
partner’s, and show distinct physiological patterns that prove they expect responses when 
engaged in dialogue – from their first moments of post-partum life (Meltzoff and Moore, 
1977; Nagy, 2008).  Infants are conscious, sentient agents (Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 
2017).  They are entities with their own sense of volition and capacity to act out desires, and 
they are born with the appropriate receptors and effectors to integrate into a social world of 
thoughts, feelings, and actions.  Superficially, the infant looks like a self-contained entity 
capable of maintaining herself without the aid of others and, at times, she is.  Yet, at other 
times, the infant has explicit need for another to provide for her and it is here where I argue 
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her integration with others can become so complete that for a moment, she forms an 
ontological whole with her mother.     
 
The infant’s life oscillates between needs for provision and spans of self-provision.  In acting 
out these phases, I argue the infant becomes psychically joined to another through the sharing 
of regulatory processes and volitional activity that occur in the same time and in common 
space with her mother and with shared, co-active physiological activity.  One mild example 
of this is in the shared timing of intention and action in protoconversation co-created between 
infant and mother (Delafield-Butt and Trevarthen, 2015; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 
2013; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2017).  These early, co-created narratives establish 
higher-order social cognition leading to language and shared meaning (Bruner, 1990).  
Another, more fundamental kind more intensely charged with vital feeling occurs markedly 
during moments of intense infant anxiety.  I use these moments as a central, illustrative 
example, because at these points in time unification of mind rises out of its normal ground 
state to come together to work on controlling an immediate and intense process of 
psychophysiological importance, with its active feeling dimensions in play in common time 
and with common regulatory control (Tronick, 2005).  Two minds become one.    
 
Voluntary Control, Homeostasis, and Unit Integrity 
The postpartum infant must move her skeletal musculature with guided gestures and must cry 
out and express feelings to obtain the warmth, food, and security needed for her continued 
existence. Voluntary control acted in intersubjective, social relations becomes an important 
mediator of desires and provisioner of needs (Trevarthen et al., 2015).  The case is quite 
different in utero where all needs for existence are provided directly by involuntary 
physiological processes and the function of the central nervous system plays an ancillary role.  
The infant in utero has no need to command warmth, attention, food, or other provisions of 
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containment.  Ex utero the infant’s same physiological needs must be provided for through 
volitional neuromuscular control negotiated through the reciprocal neuromotor actions of 
adult others.  Voluntary motor control becomes a principle mediator in lieu of placental 
uterine provision.  Thus, the intending brains of both infant and mother become primary 
mediators.  The transition from a unified physiological relation between mother and child in 
utero to one with nervous volitional independence ex utero marks the transition from a basic 
physiological relationship to one mediated by two thinking and feeling bodies with two 
central nervous systems that make movements intentional, and that communicate their 
motives to one another (Trevarthen, Delafield-Butt and Schögler, 2010).  However separate 
these two bodies and brains may be postpartum, the newborn infant alone can only remain 
viable for short periods of time.  It is within the larger infant-adult system that she is able to 
find the provisions to maintain prolonged ‘homeostatic’ control to preserve the necessary 
balance for her health and well-being.  As the infant develops, she becomes more 
autonomous gaining greater self-regulatory capacities.  The vital coupling between infant and 
parent diminishes over these first months and years of life as she ‘internalizes’, or learns, 
self-regulatory processes from her experiences of co-regulatory processes enacted with her 
mother and other caring persons in early life (Feldman et al., 1999; Feldman, 2007).  She thus 
masters a learned ability for self-regulation with newly developed psychophysiological 
capacities (Fairbairn, 1952).   
 
Still, at birth and in the first months of life, the infant remains in a dynamic waxing and 
waning relation sometimes more tightly and sometimes more loosely coupled to the mother 
and in this sense holds properties as one component – not one individual, but one component 
– in a super-ordinate dyadic system.  I argue it is this close relation between infant-and-
mother that generates the compelling motive in both to act in ways that promote the 
psychological and physiological integrity of the ‘unit’ as a whole, and in so doing promotes 
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the vital integrity of the ‘individuals’ within it.  There exists a certain force that works to 
preserve the integrity of the unit.  One mechanism of this coupling is through the mirror 
neuron system that reflects aspects of the mental state of one in the other, enabling direct 
neural resonance with sympathetic apprehension of the other’s state of mind (Gallese, 2007; 
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008).  Similarly, the polyvagal system allows direct autonomic co-
regulation between individuals through the social engagement system (Porges, 2011).  Thus, 
a crisis in the baby can become a crisis reflected in the mother by direct resonance, and not 
require any additional higher-order mentalization.  Her solution to this problem, her means of 
regulating the crisis both within her and within her baby becomes the same solution for both 
her and her baby, and her baby learns this.  
 
Processual Units 
I will introduce the notion of a ‘processual unit’ borrowed from a process metaphysic that 
treats the ontology of things as units that extend through time with discreet beginnings, 
developments, and moments of peak excitation before they resolve to satisfaction and are 
concluded.  These ontological units are the basis of Whitehead’s process metaphysic 
(Delafield-Butt, 2008; Whitehead, 1929), where each unit comprises intention, action, and 
satisfactory conclusion (Delafield-Butt, 2014).  This basic ontological unit serves as the basis 
for one event of ‘homeostatic control’.  I will illustrate this concept by focusing on the 
newborn when she is in a particularly heightened state of anxiety where the need for coupling 
is pronounced and so where both the psychological and physiological character of the 
coupling is clearly observable.  In these cases, the dyadic whole is most clear and the 
function of each participant to create whole ‘processual units’ is amplified and made 
observable.  The strength of the coupling can then recede; the infant’s life is one of coupling 
and de-coupling, of forming ontological wholes with others and receding again into 
ontological wholes with herself in a to-and-fro manner over the course of the day.  By 
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defining a processual unit and giving measure to its morphology of mutual regulation through 
an examination of a particular class of infant cry (the most extreme cry of anxiety), this paper 
better informs our perspective on what constitutes the infant-parent system by identifying 
where the infant and parent are clearly component parts in a greater ontological entity, and 
where the infant and parent are distinct individual ontological entities on their own.   
 
When we consider the life of an infant – or any animal for that matter – action stands out as 
primary processual feature.  Sensorimotor control of movement is one of the defining 
characteristics of mental phenomena (Gibson, 1966; Hurley, 1998; Lee, 2005; Noë, 2004; 
Delafield-Butt and Gagnopadhyay, 2013; Delafield-Butt, 2014).  Any one act contains within 
it the four essential features of a processual unit: the aim of the subject enacting the 
movement, the appropriation of sense data and the integration of ongoing sense data during 
the movement in feed-back control, and the final satisfaction as the goal of the movement is 
reached and the action concludes to quiescence.  The net result of any action is an ‘act’ of 
experience that has acquired a new position, and from which the organism can continue onto 
the next act (Delafield-Butt and Adie, 2016; Delafield-Butt, 2018).  Each sensorimotor act is 
a pearl on the string (Delafield-Butt and Schögler, 2007).   
 
The infant’s cry is one such act.  Indeed, any vocal utterance by an infant or by an adult, is a 
discreet unit of sensorimotor activity.  Each cry is distinct, each cry is discreet, and each cry 
is defined by an initiation, build, climax, and conclusion to quiescence.  Each cry is an act of 
experience that places the infant into a new set of relations with her internal and external 
worlds.  Thus, each cry is a step along the walk of life, as all one’s actions are.  For a life to 
succeed with health and integrity, these steps must be made with efficient action for 
completion.  Typically, an infant’s cry is completed by the infant alone, except in times of 
very extreme distress when the infant does not complete her cry.  These times of peak distress 
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and peak anxiety when the infant cannot complete her cry are marked moments when the 
infant cannot self-regulate and needs the psychophysiological capacities of another, adult 
individual for closure.  The functional presence of the other to close the process means that, 
in essence, the infant has become coupled, or ‘melded’, to the other so that together they can 
be formally viewed as a single ontological entity – for the time it takes to close the anxiety of 
the infant and return her to her own self-regulated flow of processes.   
 
The case of extreme, acute infant anxiety illustrates the ontological unit and the necessity for 
an adult in the adult-infant system to give a unit of process closure.  In the case of an episode 
of extreme, acute anxiety, regulation or containment by another is necessary for its 
satisfactory resolution.  Anxiety is a primary human experience and a principal regulatory 
motive for action (Bowlby, 1973; Spitz, 1950).  In infancy, anxiety is transmitted by the cry, 
a loud and clear indication to listeners that she is distressed and something must be done 
about it.  Her call for help is peculiar, because the infant cannot ‘know’ in a cognitive sense 
from past internalized experience that there is another to help.  Yet, even the very newborn’s 
cry does just this, it makes a connection with adult others, arouses their autonomic system, 
and compels them forward to assist (Donoval and Leavitt, 1985).  The cry reins them in to 
give closure to an uncontrolled condition.  
 
The cry presents a very clean, single mode of expression that we may examine, removed 
from all the other complexes of body movements and autonomic signals.  The newborn’s 
anxiety and its communication through the cry are present and prospective feelings and 
actions.  The cry expresses this complex of feeling and in doing so it resonates with listeners 
who, when acting in sympathy with the infant, will work to make those seemingly worsening 
changes change for the better.  The infant may cry because of an awareness that it cannot 
manage the internal physiological changes that are happening, either because of their sudden 
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and sharp intensity, or because of a diminution in supportive or associated dimensions.  
These changes can be, for example, a sudden change in her ambients, i.e. temperature, 
tactility, visuo-acoustics, etc., or its internal ‘ambients’, ie. nutritional availability, core 
temperature, somato-intestinal disruptions, etc.  Or she may cry because of the absence of 
another, felt through the associated complexes of acoustic and tactile rhythms and pulses of 
the heart, breath, and circulatory system, temperature feedback regulation, and the 
accommodation of body shifts of the self by body shifts of the other.  In either case, the 
anxious newborn cry is usually an expression of the crisis of not managing, of not being able 
to self-regulate, and of a threat to her vital integrity (Bowlby, 1969; Craig et al., 2000; Fuller, 
1991). 
 
The anxious cry provides a solution, because it brings into effect self-regulation by another.  
The anxious cry recruits the capable regulatory capacity of another to fulfill the function the 
infant feels he or she cannot fulfill. The cry as an expression of her ‘internal’, felt experience 
of life.  It is her ‘mind-in-action’, an outward expression of her very being, just as our 
observation of her physical body is, and in the case of the cry it is recruiting another body, 
another capacity to fulfill that which it cannot do alone (Soltis, 2004).  
 
Completion of an Infant’s Cry by an Adult 
Infants can attempt to reduce their experience of anxiety through processes of self-regulation 
enacted by voluntary neuromuscular action.  When a newborn infant suffers anxiety, her 
autonomic and voluntary nervous systems may not have the capacity to bring the crisis under 
control.  The newborn infant may not be familiar enough with the new experiences of an ex 
utero life to know how to regulate her system or indeed to know in which direction the 
changes are currently heading. Her inability to self-regulate may feel to her like being 
propelled into an unknown and uncontrollable future.  Anxiety results and she expresses it – 
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‘express’ is derived from the Latin ex- for ‘out’ and pressare for ‘to press’, quite literally the 
infant pushes out her anxiety in voice. 
 
The anxiety is itself a change in circumstances that demands prospective control to bring the 
organism forward in time to a stable, healthy state.  In the infant’s incapacity to bring the 
change under her own control (into a controlled process of change to bring about 
satisfaction), the infant ‘presses out’, or one could say ‘projects out’, this opposite of 
satisfaction, her primary feeling of dread – a dread of the direction the change is heading in, a 
dread of the state she is in, a dread of her inability to control the change, or change the state 
she is in – into an external action, the sound of her cry.  Maiello (1995) discusses this feeling-
in-action as a ‘sound object’.   
 
In an attack of acute anxiety, the infant makes her cry by tensing her vocal apparatus to a 
peak and she holds it there.  She produces a loud, tense, high-pitched cry that extends for the 
duration she has force in her lungs to do so.  There is no seeming end in sight to such a cry.  
It is continuously climaxed and tense; it is intense.  Such a cry strikes distress in the listener, 
so much so that the listener must act, either by removing him or herself from the cry or by 
doing some action to stop the cry.  The sound itself is a fraying process that continues 
indefinitely, except for the tail of an exasperated lung with no more force for its completion.  
The infant’s cry, true to the infant herself, reflects a state of crisis without the ability for self-
control and self-containment.  It is an incomplete unit of activity without satisfaction and 
cessation.   
 
With her cry the infant has initiated a subjective goal to self-regulate to bring herself back to 
her steady state, her stable, grounded well-being.  It is only with the sympathetic completion 
of this unit in collaboration with the actions of another that the infant can return to a calm 
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ground state.  The compulsion raised in the other to assist may be due to an inherent 
recognition of this fraying process, a dislike for it, and a drive to complete the process 
initiated by the infant.  In doing so, the adult holds the infant, brings her close to his or her 
body, and typically makes soft, repetitive coos counter-balancing the fraying intensities of 
her cry and bringing her physiology in line with a contained, organized well-being.  After 
successive re-iterations of her cries on the one hand, and the soft coos on the other, altogether 
with the manifold actions of the body expressing this same anxiety and counter-current 
through sets of tensions in other muscle groups of the arms, the back, and the face, the infant 
and the adult begin to calm and her fraying cries begin to subside into hushed sputters until, 
finally, there is quiet, calm, and restoration of balance.     
 
The final satisfaction and conclusion to the event requires the capabilities and presence of an 
adult other.  Together, the infant and the adult form one complete system that is able to bring 
the process initiated by the anxiety in the infant and in the mother to a close and so allow this 
experience of a completed and regulated process to enter into future events as antecedent 
datum.  The process becomes lodged in memory and the means to re-enact it internalized.   
 
The psychoacoustic character of the newborn’s cry of distress stands in contrast to her gentle 
coos, especially those made in a rested and calm state.  These latter vocalizations produce 
soft middles that round into ends that conclude with a gentle drop in intensity.  Coos such as 
these may start off as signs of distress and initiate in the same manner as an anxiety cry, but 
they are ‘contained’ by the infant alone and brought to a state of satisfactory conclusion. The 
rounding of the cry appears to be the result of the infant self-regulating, reflected in the 
pressing out of the shape of the sound – its gentle rise in intensity, build in the body of the 
sound – a richness of timbre and pitch – and soft drop in intensity to close.  The infant 
appears organized, satisfied, and even happy.  She may play with these sounds.  These self-
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concluded coos that initiated as small anxieties appear to be signs of the first self-regulations, 
or self-containments by the infant.  They may also be the first observable signs of internal 
objects.   
 
Containment, Reciprocity, and Unification 
The capability of a parent to calm a distressed infant simply by holding and cooing softly to 
her is one of the most remarkable phenomena of early infant-parent life (Bell and Ainsworth, 
1972).  The effect on both is profound.  As the infant calms, her anxious cries begin to cease, 
her heart and respiratory rate decrease, and she visibly becomes contented.  A seeming crisis 
is averted by the parent simply being there and holding the new child with intuitive 
sympathetic understanding.  So-called ‘higher order’ adult thoughts that one may bring to this 
situation are not important, only the being there for the infant is important for the infant, and 
it is essential (Brazelton, 2006).    
 
The joining together of two individuals in a single reciprocal dyadic system creates between 
them whole processual units of psychological and physiological mutual regulation, such as in 
the completion of a process initiation by her cry of distress.  The infant is not only an infant, 
but is subsumed into an infant-mother system.  The compulsion by the adult to respond to the 
infant’s anxious cry is a compulsion to satisfy a unit of process that has begun, but in the case 
of her anxiety is stuck without the capacity for completion, ie. without the capacity for 
satisfaction and health.  It is only with the regulatory elements available from the adult that 
the process can come to completion and both can advance to a new situation.  The engaged 
adult, being the more capable and responsible element of the system in the infant’s anxiety is 
said to ‘contain’ the infant (Bion, 1959; Douglas, 2007; Delafield-Butt, 2009).   
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It is not surprising that the adult and infant in this intimate engagement make up an 
ontological entity.  Reciprocal systems, of which they are one, are common scaffolds in 
biological organisms that work as principal organizing features (Freeman, 2000).  It is only 
the physical separation of the baby and adult in two bodies with two distinct brains that 
causes one to assume the infant is a complete, ontologically distinct entity in her own right.  
Indeed, this is the paradox of individuation.  As one differentiates, one becomes more 
autonomous with a greater degree of self-regulation, a case illustrated by the impressive 
caesura of birth, yet one is always dependent on the activities of others and so no absolute 
autonomy exists.   
 
The life of the fetus joined in amphoteronomic regulation with the mother (Trevarthen et al., 
2015) becomes the life of the infant with marked voluntary control made in dialogue with a 
caring other person, a transition marked by a loss of somatic integration and the consequent 
deployment of voluntary neural regulations.  However, as we have shown and as all mothers 
and father intuitively know, the baby and her parents remain intimately coupled to each other 
through shared affective states expressed in common time.  Physical separation in space does 
not exclude a unity of mind, and it is this shared mind that is the felt experience of living 
together that provides the essential containment for healthy development.      
 
Conclusion: Completion in the Mother-Infant System  
Winnicott’s famous phrase, “There is no such thing as an infant” (Winnicott, 1965), is 
perhaps a little more clear now.  In some spans of time over the course of many seconds and 
minutes the infant is reasonably an entity of its own, but this independence can change 
quickly to a state where the infant is dependent on and necessarily coupled to, another person 
for vital regulation and provision.   The metaphysics of living process suggest that conscious 
action is composed of units that initiate toward the subject’s aim, build through processes of 
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integration and re-integration, climax in satisfaction, and finally conclude to quiescence, 
leaving their legacy for future occasions as learned process and memory (Sprigge, 1983; 
Whitehead, 1929).  Processes that initiate must find completion, lest they be left dangling.   
 
Interestingly, the anxiety expressed by the infant in her vocal cry reflects an initiated process 
that has not come to completion.  The anxious newborn infant cry is a call for help because it 
is an incomplete action that opens and retains a peak sonic intensity without drawing down to 
a controlled quiescence and conclusion.  The anxious cry stands in contrast psychologically 
and acoustically to the contented coo, which is not a call for help because it is a complete 
action with a clear initiation, build, peak climax of intensity, and conclusion to quiescence. 
As a thing, the infant’s cry is a sonic projection of the infant’s internal, mental state.  The 
lack of satisfactory completion to the acute anxiety cry mirrors the lack of satisfaction and 
conclusion to the infant’s self-regulatory processes; it becomes an external expression of her 
internal crisis.  The incomplete process of the anxious cry grates and compels the listener to 
do what the infant cannot, contain the infant by bringing her regulatory processes to a 
satisfactory conclusion, thereby completing the incomplete process and bringing to a close 
this particular episode.    
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